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The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
"Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of
Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed
Amended Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM*
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the trial court
has a gatekeeping obligation to determine whether the explanative the-
ory underlying every expert witness's testimony is "reliable," regardless
of whether it is based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge. A proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 purports
to reflect the foregoing by requiring the trial judge to determine that the
expert's testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods,"
before the expert is permitted to testify. This article explores the mean-
ing of "reliable" and concludes that the trial court should not be required
to determine whether the explanative theory actually works, either as a
general matter or as actually applied, i.e., produces a correct, accurate,
truthful, valid conclusion. Rather, the trial court should determine
whether there are sufficient assurances present so that the expert wit-
ness's explanative theory, as actually applied in the matter at hand to
facts, data, or opinions sufficiently established to exist, produces an
accurate result to warrant jury acceptance.
I. THE DA UBERT DILEMMA
When "scientific" evidence is offered as substantive "evidence" or
as forming the basis of an expert's opinion, the "reliability" of the scien-
tific fact derived from a scientific principle generally depends on the
following factors: (1) the reliability of the underlying scientific princi-
ple; (2) the reliability of the technique or process that applies the princi-
ple; (3) the condition of any instrumentation used in the process; (4)
adherence to proper procedures; (5) the qualifications of the person who
performs the test; and (6) the qualifications of the person who interprets
the results.' With respect to the first two criteria, the predominant com-
mon-law test in the United States for determining that evidence is suffi-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami, B.S.E., 1964, University of Pennsylvania; J.D.,
1967, Columbia University.
1. See P. GIArLkaI & E. IMWINKELRIED, CRMImNAL EVIDENCE 83-90 (1979).
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ciently reliable to be admitted was first enunciated in 1923 in Frye v.
United States.' The test is based on the general acceptance of the scien-
tific principle:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific prin-
ciple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.3
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' an opinion not binding on state courts,
declared that Frye "general acceptance" test did not survive adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. At the same time, the Supreme Court
imposed a requirement that with respect to scientific evidence, the trial
judge must act as a gatekeeper and screen scientific evidence to ensure
reliability under Rules 702 and 104(a).
In interpreting the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
as a statute, the Supreme Court not only observed that nothing in the text
of Rule 702 incorporates the general acceptance test of Frye, it also
opined that the test is at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to 'opinion' testimony."5 The Supreme Court concluded that
Frye is "incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence [and] should
not be applied in federal trials."6
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
6. Id. at 595-96. As to the argument that abandonment of the "general acceptance" test
would result in a " 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confronted by absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions," the Supreme Court emphasized its faith in the adversary system and
the capabilities of juries. Id. With respect to "scientific" testimony that satisfies the reliability-
validity assessment mandated by Rule 702 made by the trial judge pursuant to Rule 104(a):
[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61
(1987). Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of
evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror
to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to
direct a judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary
judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56.
Id. at 596. Similarly found unpersuasive was the contention that "recognition of a screening role
for the judge that allows for the exclusion of "invalid" evidence will sanction a stifling and repres-
sive scientific orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth." Id.
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Although Frye was displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Supreme Court held that the trial judge must screen scientific evidence
to ensure reliability.7 The requirement in Rule 702 that the expert's tes-
timony pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evi-
dentiary reliability or scientific validity. In addition, Rule 702 requires
that the evidence offered "assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue," a condition that goes primarily to
relevance.8 The Daubert Court said:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2)
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether ... that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.9
While declining to set out a definitive checklist or test, the Supreme
Court provided a series of factors that will assist the trier of fact when
determining whether a theory, technique, reasoning, methodology, etc.
(collectively referred to as an "explanative theory") is scientific knowl-
edge. The Supreme Court initially suggested that a key question is
whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested. The
importance of testability speaks to the very nature of scientific method-
ology: "Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses
and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology
is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."'"
The Supreme Court then suggested that another important consider-
ation is peer review (but expressly notes that publication is not a sine
qua non of admissibility)." In fact, the Supreme Court explained:
Publication ... does not necessarily correlate with reliability, and in
some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have
been published. Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too
new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the
scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of "good sci-
ence," in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
8. Id. at 591.
9. Id. at 592-93.
10. Id. at 593 (citing Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv.
643, 645 (1992)); see also C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966) ("[T]he
statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test"); K. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)
("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability.").
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
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flaws in methodology will be detected. The fact of publication (or
lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific valid-
ity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is
premised. 1 2
The third factor appropriately considered is the known or potential rate
of error, while the fourth factor is the existence and maintenance of stan-
dards controlling the technique's operation.13 The fifth and final factor
was subtly developed by the Supreme Court:
Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the
inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not require, although it does
permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and
an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within
that community." Widespread acceptance can be an important factor
in ruling particular evidence admissible, and "a known technique that
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,"
may properly be viewed with skepticism.
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on princi-
ples and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testi-
mony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable
rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise
inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Rule 706 allows
the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its
own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant
evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury. . . ." Judge Weinstein has explained: "Expert evidence can be
both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evalu-
ating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible preju-
dice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses."1 4
12. Id. at 593-94 (internal citations omitted).
13. Id. at 594.
14. Id. at 594-95 (internal citations omitted); see generally FED. R. EvID. 702 (proposed)
advisory committee's note ("Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific factors explicated by the
Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested - that
is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead
simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2)
whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
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Attempting to understand the application of Daubert by trial and
appellate courts in the years that immediately followed can be frustrat-
ing. Daubert is a very incomplete case, if not a very bad decision. It did
not, in any way, accomplish what it was meant to, i.e., encourage more
liberal admissibility of expert witness evidence. Rather, it created a
more stringent test for expert evidence admissibility, especially in civil
cases. What resulted, was a series of conflicting and confusing opinions.
The difficulties with Daubert are many. Most significant is that
while eradicating the Frye test for all cases, Daubert only explicitly pro-
vided a standard for admissibility of "scientific" evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702,15 making it unclear whether the gatekeeping role
applied to "technical or other specialized knowledge." Moreover, the
Daubert Court stated that the requirements of Rule 702 applied to all
"scientific" evidence and not "specially or exclusively to unconventional
evidence," i.e., "'novel' scientific techniques."16 In short, Daubert, on
its face did not apply "gatekeeping" to "technical or other specialized
knowledge," while holding that Rule 702 required all "scientific" evi-
dence be subjected to gatekeeping.1 7
The fact that Daubert resulted in substantial confusion is not sur-
prising. For example, what happens when expert witnesses testify based
on experience acquired by "technical or other specialized knowledge,"
referred to as "skilled experts," or when other expert witnesses testify
based on "technical or other specialized knowledge" in product liability
cases? Is an expert engineer or person with thirty years of practical
experience testifying as to "scientific" knowledge when opining as to
how a product could be made safer, or is it "technical or other special-
ized knowledge"? If the former and the five Daubert factors are rigor-
ously applied, the chances of such experts being able to opine that the
product could have been made safer by doing X and Y is problematic.
Satisfaction of the five Daubert factors would very often, at a minimum,
require the construction and testing of the alternative design beyond the
financial capacity of the party or the litigation.
Moreover, if something is not "scientific" under Daubert, is judi-
cial gatekeeping nevertheless mandated? Is it in fact already incorpo-
rated in Rule 702? If so, how should the court go about deciding
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance
of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in
the scientific community. The Court in Kumho held that these factors might also be applicable in
assessing the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony, depending upon 'the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue.' 119 S.Ct. at 1175.").
15. See 28 U.S.C.A. art. VII, Rule 702 (1999)
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.il.
17. See id. at 590 n.8.
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whether an opinion of an expert skilled witness based on experience or
another type of expert, such as a university professor testifying as to
"technical or other specialized knowledge," is based on a sufficiently
trustworthy explanative theory? In short, are Daubert's five factors to
be applied to "technical or other specialized knowledge" as well, is a
different, probably more inclusive list of factors to be considered, or is a
more generalized search for assurance of evidentiary reliability to be
conducted?
Historically, as a practical matter, Frye was applied solely in crimi-
nal cases to "new and novel" explanative theories. Almost all such
cases involved forensic evidence offered by the government. Frye was
not applied in product liability cases. If a qualified expert was called to
opine, assuming a recognized field of expertise clearly existed and an
adequate factual basis was established, the expert was permitted to tes-
tify. The only objection available to the opponent was that the explana-
tive theory was "speculative and conjectural." In other words, it was so
untrustworthy as to flunk the laugh test. For example, an expert testify-
ing that a piece of falling glass caused the cancer later observed in the
area struck by the glass-post hoc ergo propter hoc-was considered
"speculative and conjectural."1 8
Now Daubert was to be applied to a variety of situations, including
those to which Frye was never applicable. The main problem is that the
language in Daubert permitted several interpretations, each of which
gave a different result. Some courts, relying on the gatekeeper language
of Daubert or Rule 702, held all explanative theories must be shown to
be reliable.' 9 Some of these courts reached that holding by applying the
18. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1999) ("This analysis
amounts to saying that because Dr. Reyna thought she had eliminated other possible causes of
fibromyalgia, even though she does not know the real 'cause,' it had to be the fall at Food Lion.
This is not an exercise in scientific logic but in the fallacy of post-hoc propter-hoc reasoning,
which is as unacceptable in science as in law. By the same 'logic,' Dr. Reyna could have
concluded that if Black had gone on a trip to Disney World and been jostled in a ride, that event
could have contributed to the onset of fibromyalgia. See, e.g., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp.,
102 F.3d 194, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1996) (expert evidence suggesting connection between exposure to
ethylene oxide and brain cancer insufficient under Daubert )."); Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Fleischer, 26 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 n. 5 (C.D.Cal. 1998) ("In this case, Dr. Long's report is
of no value in assisting the court to determine the cause or onset of Fleischer's mental disability
that occurred four years earlier. First, Fleischer's two treating physicians diagnosed him with
depression during the relevant time period. Second, as the Goomar court unequivocally stated,
'[rietrospective expert testimony regarding the existence or onset of a mental illness is
inadmissible speculation.' Goomar, 855 F.Supp. at 326. Thus, the Court declines to consider Dr.
Long's report.").
19. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2527
(1997) ("In analyzing Daubert, we have stated that 'although "Daubert dealt with scientific
experts, its language relative to the 'gatekeeper' function of federal judges is applicable to all
expert testimony offered under Rule 702."' United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir.),
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Daubert five factors to assess "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge."2 ° Others interpreted Daubert as a means to develop a more inclu-
sive list of appropriate factors to be considered and a method to evaluate
such factors in the context of the litigation when "scientific" evidence is
not involved.21 Still other courts concluded that gatekeeping, in the
sense of a threshold reliability screening, is required-while specifically
declining to mandate the five Daubert factors or an expanded version
thereof.22 Finally, other courts concluded that gatekeeping in any sense
is mandated only as to "scientific" evidence,23 leaving the explanative
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1162 (1996) (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111 (1995)). It is thus clear that a district court has the duty to
decide not only whether evidence is relevant but also whether it is reliable. See id. But this
conclusion does not come from the Daubert opinion itself; rather, it comes from the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
That these requirements [of relevance and reliability] are embodied in Rule 702
is not surprising. Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted
wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on first-hand
knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of
the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge-a rule which represents 'a "most
pervasive manifestation" of the common law insistence upon "the most reliable
sources of information."' Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. R.ule Evid. 602, 28
U.S.C.App., p. 755 (citation omitted)-is premised on an assumption that the
expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his
discipline.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
20. See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5 (4th ed.
1996 & Supp. 2000).
21. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note, infra note 56.
22. See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (C.D.Ill. 1997) ("A number of courts
have recognized these distinctions and have refused to apply the [five] factors specified in
Daubert to expert testimony which is not easily subjected to the experimental method of the 'hard'
sciences. See, e.g., Jones, 107 F.3d at 1157-58 (handwriting analysis); Tyus v. Urban Search
Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 2409, 138
L.Ed.2d 175 (U.S. 1997) (impact of advertisements upon viewers of different races); Roback v.
V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (7th Cir. 1996) (measurement of truck performance
taken by expert's self-designed equipment); United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1441-42
(7th Cir. 1996) (translation of gang code); United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir.
1996) (legal expert); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996) (legal expert);
United States v. Velasquez, 64, F.3d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Daubert to handwriting
analysis only as 'an exercise in caution'); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19,
25 (2d Cir. 1994) (geotechnical and underground construction experts); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust, 934 F.Supp. 1068, 1087 n. 10 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (medical testimony about
problems with contraceptive device), aff'd, 114 F.3d 117 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United
States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027, 1039-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (handwriting analysis);
Nations v. State, 944 S.W.2d at 800-01 (eyewitness identifications).").
23. See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Right Int'l of Ha., Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998)
("[R]ecent decisions in this circuit have called into question whether Daubert should apply to
technical, as opposed to scientific expertise. In Webb, 115 F.3d at 716, this court held that the
Daubert standards of admission did not apply to expert testimony regarding law enforcement,
because the testimony did not involve scientific knowledge. More recent, in McKendall, 122 F.3d
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theory underlying "technical and other specialized knowledge" subject
only to the requirements applicable to expert testimony generally.
Daubert boxed the lower courts into working within a structure not
properly anticipated by the Supreme Court. More importantly, Daubert
did not function well at all. The Supreme Court sought to encourage
liberal admissibility.24 It believed it was abolishing a strict Frye test in
favor of a more liberal factor balancing analysis. But instead of liberal
admissibility, the direct opposite occurred. First, all "scientific" evi-
dence was now subject to Daubert's five factor analysis, including sci-
entific evidence in civil cases never previously exposed to significant
gatekeeping. When a gatekeeping test is applied where one was not
before, less expert witness testimony is admissible, which is hardly a
liberalization. In situations where Frye previously had been applied,25
while probably not resulting in many expert opinions being excluded
where previously admitted, Daubert hardly significantly liberalized
admissibility. Very little, if anything, is admitted in the federal courts
using Daubert that is excluded in state courts still following Frye.2 6
Second, Frye was not applied to "technical or other specialized
knowledge" except for social science explanative theories,27 such as
eyewitness identification, hypnotic recollection, post traumatic stress
disorder, battered wife syndrome, child sexual abuse syndrome, etc.
When Daubert gatekeeping is applied in these social science areas,
admissibility is more difficult, especially if the five Daubert factors are
employed rigorously. Of course, controlled study falsifiability does not
comport well with social science-we correctly refuse to abuse a child
for the sake of research. Once again, there is no liberalization here.
Finally, with respect to other "technical or other specialized knowledge"
experts, such as skilled experts and university professors used in product
at 806, this court noted that '[tihe Ninth Circuit has recognized that Daubert is confined to the
evaluation of "scientific" expert testimony.'").
24. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25. See FED. R. EvID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note:
A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony
is the exception rather than the rule. Daubert did not work a 'seachange over
federal evidence law,' and 'the trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to
serve as a replacement for the adversary system.' United States v. 14.38 Acres of
Land Situated in Leflore County, Mississippi, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.1996).
As the Court in Daubert stated: 'Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.' 509 U.S. at
595.
26. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 20.
27. This assumes that such social sciences explanative theories are not considered "scientific"
under Daubert.
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liability cases, application of Daubert is more restrictive because Frye
was never previously applied in these matters.
Generally, federal courts were unable to legitimately fight their way
out of the Daubert five factor analysis gatekeeping box. "New or novel"
was not a distinction,28  and no other limitation was suggested by
Daubert.
Confronted with this frustrating gatekeeping box, federal courts, on
occassion, have attempted to avoid Daubert at the cost of distorting the
clear understanding of how the evidence rules operate with respect to
expert witnesses. Two illegitimate avoidance approaches were under-
taken. First, it was asserted, albeit incorrectly, that as long as the wit-
ness has personal knowledge of the factual basis for her opinion (e.g.,
reliance on business records and industry experience) that was not
acquired for purposes of the litigation, the witness may testify as a lay
witness.29 Under these circumstances, a witness can only be classified
as an expert if she either reasonably relies upon information furnished
by others (Rule 703), or acquires information forming the factual basis
of an opinion for purposes of litigation.3 ° Second, it was also incorrectly
28. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n. 11 ("Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively
on 'novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or
exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to
be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that
are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of
thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.").
29. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 20.
30. See Hartzell Mfg. v. American Chem. Tech., 899 F.Supp. 405, 408-09 (D.Minn. 1995)
("From these fairly modest beginnings, Rule 701 has been interpreted expansively so as to permit
the admission of an opinion, if it is based upon 'relevant historical or narrative facts that the
witness has perceived,' United States v. Oliver, 908 F.2d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1990), quoting Teen-
Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Intern, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980), and 'if it would help the
factfinder determine a matter in issue.' United States v. Oliver, supra at 263, quoting Hurst v.
United States, 882 F.2d 306, 312 (8th Cir. 1989). This broadening of Rule 701's application
arises from the grafting of Rule 602's prohibition against the admission of 'testimony concerning
matters the witness did not observe or had no opportunity to observe.' United States v. Oliver,
supra at 263. Indeed, our Court of Appeals has concluded that '[plersonal knowledge or
perception acquired through review of records prepared in the ordinary course of business, or
perceptions based on industry experience, is a sufficient foundation for lay opinion testimony.'
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. State of Neb., 802 F.2d 994, 1004 (8th Cir. 1986), citing Famer v.
Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1977), and Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d
958, 961 (4th Cir. 1977). Moreover, the mere fact that the witness, by virtue of his education,
training or expereince, is capable of being qualified as an expert, does not serve as a valid
objection to his expression of lay opinion testimony. Famer v. Paccar, Inc., supra at 529. In view
of this 'modem trend favorfing] the admission of opinion testimony,' some of the former
distinctions, between Rule 701 and Rule 702's expert testimony, may tend to blur somewhat.
Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Intern., Inc., supra at 403. Nevertheless, as recognized by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, certain clear distinctions still exist: "The essential difference,
however is that a qualified expert may answer hypothetical questions. * * * Thus, an expert
witness may not only testify from 'facts or data * * * perceived by him," but also from what is
'made known to him at or before the hearing." Fed.R.Evid. 703." Where the lay witness's
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testimony is based upon perceptions, which are insufficient to allow the formation of an opinion
that would be helpful to an understanding of the facts of the case but, instead, merely expresses
the wintess's beliefs, then the opinion testimny should be excluded. United States v. Cortez, 935
F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1062, 112 S.Ct. 945, 117 L.Ed 2d 114
(1992).").
In Asplundh Manufacturing Division v. Benton Harbor Engineering, 57 F.3d 1190, 1199 (3d
Cir. 1995), the court recognized that some decisions have permitted lay witnesses to testify to
opinions in areas "in which it would ordinarily be expected that only an expert qualified under
Rule 702 could give such testimony, such as whether a product design was defective or whether
certain factors (e.g., a product defect) caused an accident." It then proceeded to sanction lay
witness testimony "as to technical matters such as product defect or causation," while imposing a
requirement that a lay witness "with first hand knowledge can offer an opinion akin to expert
testimony in most cases, so long as the trial judge determines that the witness possesses sufficient
and relevant specialized knowledge and experience to offer the opinion," referring to Rule 702
and Daubert. Id. at 1201-02. It is suggested that rather than impose expert witness admissibility
requirements upon a so-called technical lay witness, it would be much easier and more in accord
with the text of Rules 701 and 702 to treat such witnesses as experts under Rule 702, i.e., if it
looks like a duck, etc., it's a duck.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it has "allowed lay witnesses opinions that required
specialized knowledge," if the opinions are "straightforward conclusion from observations
inferred by his own experience." United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1997).
For example, a court could permit a lay witness to provide an overview of banking regulations and
practices, while refusing to extend lay witness testimony to include an experienced bank
examiner. Id. at 429. The Fifth Circuit is in support of permitting lay witnesses to express
opinions that require specialized knowledge characterizes Rule 701 as permitting a lay witness
based upon personal perception to opine if the opinion is "one that a normal person would form
from those perceptions." Id. at 428. Rule 701 in fact states that if the witness is not testifying as
an expert the witness may testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is "rationally based on
the perception of the witness." Rule 701 thus provides that the opinion must be able to be drawn
by any person possessing a generally present background upon observation; it does not provide for
admissibility of opinions a normal person possessing specialized knowledge would be able to
draw from the same observation.
A proposed amendment to Rule 701 working its way to Congress pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, for which the earliest possible effective date is December 1, 2000, would bring an
end once and for all to this avoidance tactic. That proposed rule is as follows:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue+ and
(c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.
Proposed Advisory Committee's Note
Rule 701 has been amended to eliminate the risk that the reliability
requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of
proffering an expert in lay witness clothing. Under the amendment, a witness'
testimony must be scrutinized under the rules regulating expert opinion to the extent
that the witness is providing scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702. See generally Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor
Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190 (3d Cir. 1995). By channeling testimony that is actually expert
testimony to Rule 702, the amendment also ensures that a party will not evade the
expert witness disclosure requirements set forth in F.R.C.P. 26 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 16
by simply calling an expert witness in the guise of a layperson. See Joseph,
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asserted that an expert testifying whether a product is defectively
designed is not subject to Daubert gatekeeping if the expert's testimony
is based upon general scientific principles and years of practical experi-
ence, since it is "not based on any particular methodology or tech-
nique. To conclude that "no methodology or technique," (i.e.,
Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993 Disclosure Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97, 108 (1996) (noting that "there is no good
reason to allow what is essentially surprise expert testimony," and that "the Court
should be vigilant to preclude manipulative conduct designed to thwart the expert
disclosure and discovery process"). See also United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125
F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997) (law enforcement agents testifying that the
defendant's conduct was consistent with that of a drug trafficker could not testify as
lay witnesses; to permit such testimony under Rule 701 "subverts the requirements
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E)").
31. Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996); accord McKendall
v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1997):
Although we have not previously confronted this issue in the context of a
products liability case, the Tenth Circuit faced a factual situation similar to this case
in Compton. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1515 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996). We find Compton
instructive. Compton involved a plaintiff who brought a products liability action
against the manufacturer of an automobile. The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle
was defectively designed because there was excessive intrusion of the roof and side
of the automobile into the passenger compartment during rollover. Id. at 1516. The
plaintiff's expert was a mechanical engineer who proffered testimony that the car
was defectively designed because it permitted excessive roof crush. Id. He testified
that to correct the alleged defect, he would design the vehicle to allow only two to
three inches of roof crush. Id. Like Siegel, the expert here, the expert in Compton,
examined the allegedly defective product and read relevant literature but did not
provide a model or test his proposed design. Id. at 1516-17.
The district court allowed the expert to testify, relying in part on Daubert, for
its rationale. The Tenth Circuit, on appeal, upheld the admission of the testimony
but concluded that Daubert did not apply to the proffered testimony. The court
noted that "application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where expert
testimony is based solely upon experience or training .... In such cases, Rule 702
merely requires the trial court to make a preliminary finding that proffered expert
testimony is both relevant and reliable while taking into account '[t]he inquiry
envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one."' Id. at 1518-19. (citations omitted).
In language particularly relevant here, the court concluded:
In sum, we do not believe Daubert completely changes our traditional
analysis under Rule 702. Instead Daubert sets out additional factors the trial
court should consider under Rule 702 if an expert witness offers testimony based
upon a particular methodology or technique.
[I]t is unnecessary to reach the question whether Daubert mandates a
further inquiry into [the expert's] "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge" under Rule 702 because we find his testimony was not based on any
particular methodology or technique. Rather, [the expert] reached his expert
conclusions by drawing upon general engineering principles and his twenty-two
years of experience as an automotive engineer.
Id. at 1519. The Compton court affinned the district court's reasoning that the
expert's testimony was "facially helpful and relevant," and thus admissible under
Rule 702. Id.
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explanative theory) is involved regarding opinion testimony on "scien-
tific, technical or other specialized knowledge," is simply untenable.32
Similarly, we conclude that Siegel's testimony, based on his engineering expe-
rience and his having investigated hundreds of fork lift cases over the past thirty
years, that a safety device is feasible, is both "facially helpful and relevant" and
seemingly reliable. See id. Crown will have every opportunity on cross-examina-
tion to point out that Siegel has not created or tested the safety device which he
suggests would have prevented the accident. The district court erred in excluding
Siegel's testimony based on Daubert.
32. As the court in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-92 (5th Cir.1997) found:
We agree for the reasons stated by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that the
Daubert analysis applies to the type of expert testimony presented by Williams.
Not every guidepost outlined in Daubert will necessarily apply to expert testimony
based on engineering principles and practical experience, but the district court's
"preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue" is no less important. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. We cannot agree with the Compton court's
conclusion that Daubert only applies when "unique, untested or controversial
methodologies or techniques" are relied on by the expert. 82 F.3d at 1518. Daubert
expressly denies that the precepts of Rule 702 apply only to unconventional
evidence. 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 11. And while Daubert dealt
with expert scientific evidence, 509 U.S. at 590 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 n. 8, the
decision's focus on a standard of evidentiary reliability and the requirement that
proposed expert testimony must be appropriately validated are criteria equally
applicable to "technical, or other specialized knowledge .. " Fed. Rule of Evid.
702. Moreover, the nonexclusive list of factors relevant under Daubert to assessing
scientific methodology-testing, peer review, and "general acceptance"-are also
relevant to assessing other types of expert evidence. Whether the expert would
opine on economic valuation, advertising psychology, or engineering, application of
the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a
person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it
would among his professional peers.
Compton also suffers from the vagueness of the line it draws between
"methodology" and other scientific or technical knowledge. As one of our district
judges aptly observed:
An alternative design is by definition a different method of configuring the
product. In the Compton case, for example, the expert was clearly
proposing that the vehicles be constructed by some other method that would
embody his proposed standards.
Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 946 F.Supp. 1241, 1247 (M.D.La.1996).
Alternative designs by definition include elements of science, technology, and
methodology. Further, it seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to
rely on general engineering principles and practical experience might escape
screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not
reached by any particular method or technique. The moral of this approach
would be, the less factual support for an expert's opinion, the better.
Compton's view of the admissibility of expert evidence is untenable.
The foregoing avoidance tactic was declared improper in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Car-
michael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999):
At the same time, and contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, some of Daubert's
questions can help to evaluate the reliability even of experience-based testimony. In
certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often
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an engineering expert's experience- based methodology has produced erroneous
results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering
community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose
expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish
among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the
field would recognize as acceptable.
We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that a trial
judge may ask questions of the sort Daubert mentioned only where an expert "relies
on the application of scientific principles," but not where an expert relies "on skill-
or experience-based observation." 131 F.3d, at 1435. We do not believe that Rule
702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain
kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases that it gener-
ates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.
A proposed amendment to Rule 702 working its way to Congress pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, for which the earliest possible effective date is December 1, 2000, would clarify
that the rule is to the same effect.
Rule 702. Testimony By Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise-; if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
Proposed Advisory Committee's Note
As stated earlier, the amendment does not distinguish between scientific and
other forms of expert testimony. The trial court's gatekeeping function applies to
testimony by any expert. See Kumho tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171
(1999) ("We conclude that Daubert's general holding-setting forth the trial
judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on
'scientific knowledge', but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other special-
ized' knowledge."). While the relevant factors for determining reliability will vary
from expertise to expertise, the amendment rejects the premise that an expert's testi-
mony should be treated more permissively simply because it is outside the realm of
science. An opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same
degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a
scientist. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[It
seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering
principles and practical experience might escape screening by the district court sim-
ply by stating that their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or
technique."). Some types of expert testimony will be more objectively verifiable,
and subject to the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and publication, than
others. Some types of expert testimony will not rely on anything like a scientific
method, and so will have to be evaluated by reference to other standard principles
attendant to the particular area of expertise. The trial judge in all cases of proffered
expert testimony must find that it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not spec-
ulative before it can be admitted. The expert's testimony must be grounded in an
accepted body of learning or experience in the expert's field, and the expert must
explain how the conclusion is so grounded. See, e.g., American College of Trial
Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994) ("[W]hether the testimony
concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other
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State supreme courts applying Frye have similarly sought to limit
the gatekeeping role of the trial court in one of two ways.33 First, courts
have limited Frye to "new or novel" explanative theories. 34 Such a limi-
tation assumes that traditional explanative theories are sufficiently
accepted under Frye to be valid and reliable, without the need to intro-
non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge and
experience' of that particular field.").
The amendment requires that the testimony must be the product of reliable
principles and methods that are reliably applied to the facts of the case. While the
terms "principles" and "methods" may convey one impression when applied to sci-
entific knowledge, they remain relevant when applied to testimony based on techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge. For example, when a law enforcement agent
testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction, the principle used by
the agent is that participants in such transactions regularly use code words to con-
ceal the nature of their activities. The method used by the agent is the application of
extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the conversations. So long as the
principles and methods are reliable, and applied reliably to the facts of the case, this
type of testimony should be admitted.
Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone - or
experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education - may
not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of
Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of
experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a
great deal of reliable expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d
1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of a hand-
writing examiner who had years of practical experience and extensive training, and
who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck, 946 F.Supp.
1241, 1248 (M.D.La. 1996) (design engineer's testimony can be admissible when
the expert's opinions "are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional
technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the infor-
mation and procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches"). See also Kumho
Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1178 (1999) (stating that "no one denies
that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on exten-
sive and specialized experience.").
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness
must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experi-
ence is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied
to the facts. The trial court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply "tak-
ing the expert's word for it." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We've been presented with only the experts'
qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert,
that's not enough."). The more subjective and controversial the expert's inquiry, the
more likely the testimony should be excluded as unreliable. See O'Conner v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) (expert testimony based on a
completely subjective methodology held properly excluded). See also Kumho tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999) ("[Ilt will at times be useful to ask
even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume
tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a
kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.").
33. Full description and critique of Frye limitation devices is clearly beyond the scope of the
caution. See, e.g., MENDEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 16.04 (1998 Supp.).
34. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 20.
2000] DETERMINING "RELIABLE" UNDER DAUBERT, ET AL 331
duce foundational proof. Second, even when the explanative technique
is "new or novel," some state courts have attempted to further limit
application of the Frye test." This limitation focuses on the perceived
capacity of the trier of fact to properly evaluate the testimony of the
expert. For example, courts may inquire as to whether a "new or novel"
explanative theory is pure opinion, not relying on a machine, sometimes
called a little black box. If it is pure opinion, the argument is the jury
can evaluate the testimony adequately and will not be overwhelmed by
an aura of scientific certainty. The jury is presumed to be sufficiently
skeptical of pure opinion testimony. On the other hand, if the expert
testimony employs a "new or novel" explanative theory that appears to
create an accurate result (such as when a black box is involved), it is
asserted that the aura of scientific certainty may overwhelm the trier of
fact. Under Frye, the trial court must assess the trustworthiness of an
expert witness's theory by applying the general acceptance test before it
allows the jury to hear the testimony of the expert witness. Therefore, if
the jury is likely to uncritically buy into the expert's evidence, the courts
must exercise a gatekeeping role to assure what is uncritically accepted
actually works.
Of course, the lines drawn in the foregoing set of limitations are
fuzzy at best. What is pure opinion? When is something a technique or
procedure, and when is it pure opinion? Are all "new and novel"
machines to be treated the same? Assuming these criteria are capable of
being applied in practice, what is the justification for the court conclud-
ing they distinguish between expert testimony incorporating a "new and
novel" explanative theory that can be reasonably assessed by the jury,
from those explanative theories likely to be uncritically accepted by the
jury as trustworthy? Daubert, in practice, permitted none of the forms
of limitation employed under Frye and, not surprisingly, federal courts
by and large sought not to introduce any on their own.3 6
35. See generally id.
36. Also not surprisingly given the mess created by Daubert, in spite of the specific position
to the contrary in Daubert, see note 16 supra, some resort to "novel" has been undertaken in
federal court. See, e.g., Masayesva on Behalf of Hopi Indian Tribe v. Hale, 118 F.3d 1371, 1379
(9th Cir.1997) ("The Navajo's reliance on Daubert is misplaced because Dr. Workman's
testimony derives from his relatively straightforward application of range economics, rather than
on a novel scientific theory"); Jugle v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576, 580
(D.Vt.1997) ("However, some courts, including the Second Circuit, have commented that
Daubert's focus was on the admissibility of novel or unorthodox scientific evidence under Rule
702. See, e.g., lacobelli Constr. Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994)
(affidavits of geotechnical consultants regarding construction site conditions, contract, and
construction results based on analysis of bid documents, geotechnical data, and geotechnical
interpretive reports 'do not present the kind of "junk science" problem that Daubert means to
address'); Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co., 857 F.Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y.1994)
('Daubert's narrow focus is on the admissibility of 'novel scientific evidence' under Fed.R.Evid.
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In summary, after Daubert, questions remained unanswered:
Daubert either does or does not impose a gatekeeping requirement to
"technical or other specialized knowledge"? And if it does, how is this
gatekeeping to be performed?
II. THE KUMHO CLARIFICATION
In 1999, the Supreme Court answered both questions in Kumho
Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael.37 It held that the Daubert "gatekeep-
ing" obligation applies to both testimony based on "scientific" knowl-
edge, as well as that based on "technical" and "other specialized"
knowledge.38 In making the "gatekeeping" determination, the trial court
702 ..... Daubert only prescribes judicial intervention for expert testimony approaching the
outer boundaries of traditional scientific and technological knowledge'), aff'd, 101 F.3d 682 (2d
Cir.1996); see also Golod v. La Roache, 964 F.Supp. 841, 848 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting
Lappe).").
37. 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).
38. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999). The opinion
continues:
In Daubert, this Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a
special obligation upon a trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony
... is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U.S., at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The initial
question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to
"scientific" testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the parties, believe that it
applies to all expert testimony. See Brief for Petitioners 19; Brief for Respondents
17.
For one thing, Rule 702 itself says:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
This language makes no relevant distinction between "scientific" knowledge
and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. It makes clear that any such
knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony. In Daubert, the Court
specified that it is the Rule's word "knowledge," not the words (like "scientific")
that modify that word, that "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability." 509
U.S., at 589-590, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies
its reliability standard to all "scientific," "technical," or "other specialized" matters
within its scope. We concede that the Court in Daubert referred only to "scientific"
knowledge. But as the Court there said, it referred to "scientific" testimony "because
that [wa]s the nature of the expertise" at issue. Id., at 590, n. 8, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
Neither is the evidentiary rationale that underlay the Court's basic Daubert
"gatekeeping" determination limited to "scientific" knowledge. Daubert pointed out
that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial latitude
unavailable to other witnesses on the "assumption that the expert's opinion will
have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Id., at 592,
113 S.Ct. 2786 (pointing out that experts may testify to opinions, including those
that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation). The Rules grant that
latitude to all experts, not just to "scientific" ones.
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer
evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction
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"may" consider one or more of the five specific Daubert factors if it will
help ascertain whether the testimony is "reliable. 39 Overall, Kumho
found that the test for "reliable" is "flexible" and that "Daubert's list of
specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts
in every case."4 "Rather the law grants a district court the same broad
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge.
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as
engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend
for its development upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And
conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines
capable of application in particular cases. Cf. Brief for National Academy of
Engineering as Amicus Curiae 9 (scientist seeks to understand nature while the
engineer seeks nature's modification); Brief for Rubber Manufacturers Association
as Amicus Curiae 14- 16 (engineering, as an "applied science," relies on "scientific
reasoning and methodology"); Brief for John Allen et al. as Amici Curiae 6
(engineering relies upon "scientific knowledge and methods").
Neither is there a convincing need to make such distinctions. Experts of all
kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned Hand
called "general truths derived from ... specialized experience." Hand, Historical
and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L.Rev. 40, 54
(1901). And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized
observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a
specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case, the
expert's testimony often will rest "upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to
[the jury's] own." Ibid. The trial judge's effort to assure that the specialized
testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate that foreign experience,
whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
We conclude that Daubert's general principles apply to the expert matters
described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such matters, "establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability." 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786. It "requires a
valid... connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id.,
at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. And where such testimony's factual basis, data, principles,
methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, see Part Ill, infra,
the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has "a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline." 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct.
2786.
Id. at 1174-76.
39. See Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1176.
40. Id. at 1171. The opinion continues:
The petitioners ask more specifically whether a trial judge determining the
"admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony" may consider several more
specific factors that Daubert said might "bear on" a judge's gate-keeping
determination. These factors include:
-Whether a "theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested";
-Whether it "has been subjected to peer review and publication";
-Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high "known or
potential rate of error" and whether there are "standards controlling the
technique's operation"; and
-Whether the theory or technique enjoys "general acceptance" within a
"relevant scientific community." 509 U.S., at 592-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
Emphasizing the word "may" in the question, we answer that question yes.
Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of
which will be at issue in some cases. See, e.g., Brief for Stephen Bobo et al. as
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Amici Curiae 23 (stressing the scientific bases of engineering disciplines). In other
cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or
experience. As the Solicitor General points out, there are many different kinds of
experts, and many different kinds of expertise. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 18-19, and n. 5 (citing cases involving experts in drug terms,
handwriting analysis, criminal modus operandi, land valuation, agricultural
practices, railroad procedures, attorney's fee valuation, and others). Our emphasis
on the word "may" thus reflects Daubert's description of the Rule 702 inquiry as "a
flexible one." 509 U.S., at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Daubert makes clear that the
factors it mentions do not constitute a "definitive checklist or test." Id., at 593, 113
S.Ct. 2786. And Daubert adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must be " 'tied to the
facts' " of a particular "case." Id., at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quoting United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (C.A.3 1985)). We agree with the Solicitor General
that "[t]he factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise,
and the subject of his testimony." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. The
conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and
for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do
so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence.
Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.
Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear that its list of factors was
meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply
even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged.
It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a
scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular
application at issue may never previously have interested any scientist. Nor, on the
other hand, does the presence of Daubert's general acceptance factor help show that
an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for
example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of
astrology or necromancy.
At the same time, and contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, some of
Daubert's questions can help to evaluate the reliability even of experience-based
testimony. In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for
example, how often an engineering expert's experience- based methodology has
produced erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the
relevant engineering community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of
a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able
to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that
others in the field would recognize as acceptable.
We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that a trial
judge may ask questions of the sort Daubert mentioned only where an expert "relies
on the application of scientific principles," but not where an expert relies "on skill-
or experience-based observation." 131 F.3d, at 1435. We do not believe that Rule
702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain
kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases that it
generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.
To say this is not to deny the importance of Daubert's gatekeeping
requirement. The objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and
relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field. Nor do we deny that, as stated in Daubert, the particular
questions that it mentioned will often be appropriate for use in determining the
reliability of challenged expert testimony. Rather, we conclude that the trial judge
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latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect of its ultimate reliability determination."'"
Whether Kumho's mandate of a flexible approach in determining
the "reliability" of the explanative theory underlying an expert witness's
testimony will significantly assist the trial courts in fulfilling their role
as "gatekeeper" can only be judged over time. While there is reason for
optimism, there is also reason for pessimism. Which direction the
must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial
court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are
reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.
Id. at 1175-76.
41. Id. at 1171. Kumho found:
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an
expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other
proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides
whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joiner
makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when
it "review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony." 522
U.S., at 138-139, 118 S.Ct. 512. That standard applies as much to the trial court's
decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion.
Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both to
avoid unnecessary "reliability" proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of
an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate
proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the
expert's reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules seek to avoid "unjustifiable expense
and delay" as part of their search for "truth" and the "jus[t] determin[ation]" of
proceedings. Fed. Rule Evid. 102. Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or
are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law
grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. See Joiner, supra, at 143, 118
S.Ct. 512. And the Eleventh Circuit erred insofar as it held to the contrary.
The "reliable" determination is governed by Rule 104(a). See Advisory
Committee's Note to proposed Rule 702 ("Rule 702 has been amended in response
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the
many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct.
1167 (1999). In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of
acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in
Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just
testimony based in science. See also Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing the
Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 702, which had been released
for public comment before the date of the Kumho decision. The amendment affirms
the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial
court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.
Consistently with Kumho, the Rule as amended provides that all types of expert
testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court in deciding whether
the evidence is reliable and helpful. Consequently, the admissibility of all expert
testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a). Under that Rule, the
proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent admissibility
requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).").
Id. at 1176.
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"gatekeeping" determination will take depends primarily on how the
courts come to view the concept of "reliable."
IL. DEFINING "RELIABLE"
A. The Supreme Court
As employed in Daubert, Kumho and elsewhere, "reliable" appears
to be given two meanings at the same time. On the one hand, "reliable"
is taken to mean that the explanative theory actually works, i.e., pro-
duces a correct, accurate, truthful, or valid conclusion.42 On the other
hand, "reliable" refers to meriting confidence worthy of dependence or
reliance, i.e., possesses sufficient assurance of correctness to warrant
acceptance by the trier of fact. The latter is the dictionary definition43 -
it also represents the underlying approach of the now rejected Frye
test." These definitions, once applied, result in two separate analyses
by the trial court: in the first, the court must determine that the explana-
tive theory "works," while in the second, only a determination is neces-
sary that there exists sufficient assurances the explanative theory
"works" to warrant acceptance by the trier of fact.45
What makes Daubert confusing is that it utilizes both meanings of
"reliable." The thrust of the opinion, including the listing of factors to
be considered, supports a conclusion that "gatekeeping" is a determina-
tion of whether the explanative theory works. The opinion even states
42. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999); Daubert v. Menell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1917 (1981).
44. See supra note 3.
45. The proposed amendment to Rule 702 displays little appreciation of the importance of
understanding what is conveyed by the word "reliable." In the initially circulated draft, the
following was proposed to be tacked on to the end of current Rule 702: "provided that (1) the
testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case." The current proposal uses the word "reliable" only twice: "if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case."
What pray tell is the meaning of the word reliable in "reliable" facts or data, the product of
"reliable" principles and methods, and the witness has applied the principles and methods
"reliably" to the facts of the case? The removal of the first "reliable" is clearly an improvement as
the court has no function in judging the "accuracy", "correctness" of the facts or data constituting
the expert's bases. The third use of "reliably" would be better expressed by stating that the
witness has "properly" applied the principles, etc., i.e., he or she followed called for procedures,
protocol, etc. The use of the term "reliable" in the phrase "product of reliable principles and
methods" is on its face ambiguous as to which of the two usages of "reliable" is intended as is the
overall tenor of the Advisory Committee's Note. Support for the "sufficient assurances of
correctness" definition of "reliable" can, however, clearly be found in the portions of the Advisory
Committee's Note quoted at note 32, supra and 56, infra.
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its confidence in federal judges to make a "preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning and methodology underlying the testimony is sci-
entifically valid.""6 That is, "the principal support[s] what it purports to
show"' 4 7 [in other words, it works], and "evidentiary reliability will be
based upon scientific validity."" At the same time, however, Daubert
states Rule 702 requires that an "expert's opinion will have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline,""9 which is a
reference to sufficient assurances the explanative theory works. At one
point in the opinion, Daubert appears to speak of both meanings at once:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.
Its overarching subject is the scientific validity and thus the eviden-
tiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a pro-
posed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.5°
This last sentence is subject to interpretation. In General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, the Supreme Court was forced to acknowledge that "conclusions
and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. '51
Kumho, for its part, is no better. The discussion of the "flexibility"
of factors to be considered in determining "the reliability of expert testi-
mony" implies a search for correctness, accuracy, etc.- that the explan-
ative theory "works."52 Moreover, in Part III of the opinion, Justice
Breyer provides an illustration of what he believes to be the proper
application of the flexible Daubert-Kumho factor approach, concluding
the "relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the
cause of this tire's separation. '53 More simply stated, does the explana-
tive theory as actually applied to the particular facts presented produce a
correct, accurate, valid result? Kumho also references reliability as
requiring sufficient assurances that the explanative theory works. It
quotes Daubert for the proposition that "the trial judge must determine
whether the testimony has 'a reliable basis in the knowledge and experi-
ence of [the relevant] discipline.' "5" Most significantly, Kumho further
states that the trial court's responsibility "is to make certain that an
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
46. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
47. Id. at 590 n. 9.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 592.
50. Id. at 594-95.
51. 552 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); see also infra, note 83 (discussing the relationship between the
explanative theory and the conclusions reached from its application).
52. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1176 (1999).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1174; see also text accompanying infra note 63.
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that characterizes the 'practice' of an expert in the relevant field." 55
B. Trial and Appellate Courts
Numerous questions of interpretation arise when one seeks to deter-
mine whether an explanative theory "works." Applying even the five
Daubert factors in a consistent and rational manner is not an easy task.
The flexible approach of Kumho, at least according to the Advisory
Committee's Note to proposed amended Rule 702,56 will put additional
55. Id. at 1176.
56. The proposed text is as follows:
Proposed Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 702
Courts both before and after Daubert have found other factors relevant in determining
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact. These factors
include:
(1) Whether experts are "proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out
of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an
unfounded conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that
in some cases a trial court "may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered").
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. See
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony excluded where the
expert failed to consider other obvious causes for the plaintiff's condition). Compare
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (the possibility of some
uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most obvious causes have
been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert).
(4) Whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work
outside his paid litigation consulting." Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940,
942 (7th Cir. 1997). See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999)
(Daubert requires the trial court to assure itself that the expert "employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field").
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for
the type of opinion the expert would give. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct.
1167, 1175 (1999) (Daubert's general acceptance factor does not "help show that an expert's
testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories
grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy.");
Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir.1998) (en bane) (clinical doctor was
properly precluded from testifying to the toxicological cause of the plaintiffs respiratory
problem, where the opinion was not sufficiently grounded in scientific methodology);
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.1988) (rejecting testimony based on
"clinical ecology" as unfounded and unreliable).
All of these factors remain relevant to the determination of the reliability of expert testimony
under the Rule as amended. Other factors remain relevant. See Kumho, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176
("[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case
how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable."). Yet no single
factor is necessarily dispositive of the reliability of a particular expert's testimony. See, e.g.,
Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir.1999) ("not only must each stage of the
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factors on the table, further complicating the process. As more factors
are created, the harder it becomes for the non-expert trial judge to deter-
mine whether an explanative theory "works."57  It is respectfully sug-
gested that the reluctance of trial and appellate judges to make this
decision, thereby becoming amateur experts themselves,58 led several
courts to develop and sanction the two avoidance techniques discussed
above, and in some instances, to limit the application of Daubert solely
to scientific knowledge. 9
On the other hand, trial and appellate judges appear to favor the
"sufficient assurances of correctness" approach.6" According to this
method, which is supported by both Daubert and Kumho, an explanative
theory used by an expert to support his or her testimony is sufficiently
"reliable" when sufficient assurances are present to warrant jury accept-
ance that the theory, as actually applied to the facts at hand, produces a
correct result.
IV. DETERMINING "SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES OF CORRECTNESS"
Ordinarily, sufficient assurances of correctness can be established
expert's testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly without
bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules."); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that some expert disciplines "have the courtroom as
a principal theatre of operations" and as to these disciplines "the fact that the expert has developed
an expertise principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be a substantial
consideration.").
57. Hopefully all trial courts, consistent with Kumho, and recent practice under Daubert, will
simply consider whatever is relevant in performing their gatekeeping obligation, (however
ultimately interpreted), rather than proceed one by one through a list of factors to be considered as
occurred in many of the early decisions applying the five Daubert factors.
58. Reluctance by appellate judges to get too deeply involved in determining what is
scientific knowledge was expressed in De-Paepe v. General Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 719-20
(7th Cir. 1998) ("GM's lawyers lampoon the methods Syson used to test the sun visor and to reach
conclusions about the engineering compromises that would optimize a sun visor's performance in
light of the risks involved. But their cri de coeur is not backed up by references to any body of
scientific knowledge. What tests do engineers use to resolve questions of the kind Syson
addressed? What tests should he have performed? What data did he overlook? Counsel
apparently want appellate judges to make a priori judgments about how scientific inquiry should
be conducted. That way quackery lies. A profession resolves questions of method in the same
way it reaches conclusions about other empirical issues; which method is best is a question itself
subject to scientific inquiry. See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER w. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE:
ScIErrFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 137-62 (1997). For all this record reveals,
Syson performed the tests that GM's staff engineers or the faculty of MIT use to reach
conclusions. (Syson was a design engineer at GM earlier in his career.) A litigant that wants a
court of appeals to set aside a district judge's decision to admit expert testimony has to do more
than appeal to a lawyer's sense of how science should be done. That is all GM has done, and we
therefore lack any basis on which to upset the district judge's decision, whether or not that
decision was correct as an independent matter.").
59. See generally GRAAM, supra note 20.
60. See id.
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by showing the explanative theory, as applied, has gained widespread
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.61 In the alterna-
tive, the explanative theory can be shown to possess sufficient assur-
ances of correctness by proof that the explanative theory, as actually
applied, possesses particularized earmarks of trustworthiness. Generally
speaking, particularized earmarks of trustworthiness can be established
61. Of course, reliance on "widespread acceptance" is subject to the limitation that the entire
field to which the explanative theory belongs does not itself simply "lack[ ] reliability." Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) ("Nor, on the other hand, does the
presence of Daubert's general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable
where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called
generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy.").
Other courts have relied on widespread acceptance as a sufficient alternative test. See United
States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 485 (7th Cir. 1998) ("We first address the contention
that the district judge failed to determine whether the techniques used to ascertain the content of
Vitek's premixes are generally accepted. All the chemical testing took place at a FDA laboratory,
where analysts performed four procedures-fourier transform infrared spectrometry, gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry, high performance liquid chromatography and electrospray
liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry. Each of these procedures reveals a substance's
'spectrum' or 'fragmentation pattern'-a sort of chemical fingerprint. Analysts then identify a
substance by comparing its spectrum with spectra from known standard samples or from a
computer library. These procedures, and the tools used to perform them, are widely used and
generally accepted in the fields of analytical and forensic chemistry."); Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d
1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Dr. Shupe's testimony conformed to a generally accepted
explanatory theory, as indicated by his citation to other authors, primarily collaborators, who have
discussed theories consistent with his."); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 21 F.Supp.2d
923, 934 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("Plaintiffs have amply demonstrated the soundness of the Cournot
model as a fundamental, time-tested economic tool that has been widely accepted for years by
reputable economists. Indeed, the Cournot model provides the theoretical underpinnings for the
Department of Justice's Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the widely used Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (the 'HHI').").
The practical utility of the alternative test of widespread acceptance was recognized in
Kumho. The court found that "The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how
to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings
are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's
relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard when it 'review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony.' That standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to
determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the
discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary
cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require
appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the
expert's reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules seek to avoid 'unjustifiable expense and delay' as part
of their search for 'truth' and the 'jus[t] determin[ation]' of proceedings. Thus, whether
Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is
a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine." See also FED. R. EvID.
702 (proposed) advisory committee's note ("Likewise, this amendment is not intended to provide
an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every expert. See Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999) (noting that the trial judge has the discretion 'both to
avoid unnecessary "reliability" proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's
methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or
more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises.').").
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if the expert's explanative theory is shown to have been derived and
employed in a manner consistent with processes customarily employed
by experts in the particular field. In other words, stated in the alterna-
tive, the explanative theory must: (1) adhere to the same standards for
intellectual rigor demanded in the expert's professional work, (2) con-
form to applicable professional standards employed outside the court-
room, (3) possess the aura of proper expert methodology, or (4) be
soundly grounded in the principles and methodology of the particular
field.62 Clearly, several courts have already moved considerably toward
adopting the foregoing reasoning.63
62. The foregoing focuses attention upon the general question as to whether development of
the explanative theory exhibits the aura of proper scientific methodology, i.e., "employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of the expert in the
relevant field," thus making the explanative theory sufficiently "reliable" for the trier of fact to
evaluate. Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Focusing on whether the explanative theory sufficiently
possesses the aura of proper scientific methodology for the trier of fact to consider rather than
requiring the trial judge to decide whether the explanative theory in fact "works" also comports
with Daubert's assertion that "vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert v. Merrell Don Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596
(1993) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1102 (7th Cir. 1999) ("First, when faced
with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the district court must 'consider whether the
testimony has been subjected to the scientific method; it must rule out "subjective belief or
unsupported speculation." ' Porter, 9 F.3d at 614 (citation omitted). This step requires that the
district court determine 'whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid.' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786."); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola
of Puerto Rico, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) ("Daubert does not require that a party who
proffers expert testimony carry the burden of proving to the judge that the expert's assessment of
the situation is correct. As long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon 'good grounds,
based on what is known,' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal quotation marks
omitted), it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active
cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its
complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies, see id. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In short,
Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing
scientific theories has the best provenance. It demands only that the proponent of the evidence
show that the expert's conclusion has been arrived at in a scientifically sound and
methodologically reliable fashion. See Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d
Cir.1997); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir.1994)."); Moore v. Ashland
Chemical Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998) ("Thus, the party seeking to have the district
court admit expert testimony must demonstrate that the expert's findings and conclusions are
based on the scientific method, and, therefore, are reliable. This requires some objective,
independent validation of the expert's methodology. The expert's assurances that he has utilized
generally accepted scientific methodology is insufficient. See Daubert v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (on remand). The proponent need not
prove to the judge that the expert's testimony is correct, but she must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the testimony is reliable."); Kannankeril v. Terminix International, Inc., 128 F.3d
802, 806 (3d Cir.1997) ("In order for the expert testimony to be 'reliable,' we have required that
the testimony be based on the 'methods and procedures of science,' rather than on 'subjective
belief or unsupported speculation.' Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744."); Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.,
126 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir.1997) ("[A] trial judge assessing the reliability of the proffer of a
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clinical physician's expert testimony based on clinical medical knowledge should determine
whether it is soundly grounded in the knowledge, principles and methodology of clinical
medicine; the 'Daubert factors,' which are techniques derived from hard science methodology,
are, as a general rule, inappropriate for use in making the reliability assessment of expert clinical
medical testimony."); Wintz by and through Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th
Cir.1997) ("Our case law interpreting Daubert has established that, when evaluating the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony, district courts are to undertake a two-step
methodology. First, the district court must 'consider whether the testimony has been subjected to
the scientific method; it must rule out "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." ' Deimer v.
Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Porter, 9 F.3d at
614). Second, the district court must ' "determine whether the evidence or testimony assists the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue." ' Id."); lacobelli
Construction, Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]hey rely upon the type
of methodology and data typically used and accepted in construction-litigation cases. Given the
inherently voluminous and highly technical nature of the data in such cases, the parties in a
construction-contract dispute usually must retain experts to summarize and interpret that data.
See, e.g., Foster Constr., 435 F.2d at 884-86; North Slope, 14 CI.Ct. at 253-61; Shank-Artukovich
v. United States, 13 CI.Ct. 346, 352-55 (1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1245 (Fed. Cir.1988). This case is
no different. After reviewing the bid documents, geotechnical data, and geotechnical interpretive
reports, Heuer and Eller each presented his own summary and analysis of the Jay-Arnett tunnel
site, lacobelli's contract, and the construction results."); In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Securities
Litigation, 979 F.Supp. 1021, 1024 (S.D.N.Y.1997) ("The valuation of damages in a securities
class action such as this does not appear to be the sort of 'hard science' that requires application of
the specific factors set forth by Daubert. We are guided, nonetheless, by the Daubert Court's
more general instruction that '[t]he inquiry envisioned by rule 702 is . . . a flexible one. Its
overarching subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.' 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113
S.Ct. at 2797. In other words, an expert's opinion should at least 'have a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience' of the particular 'discipline' involved. 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at
2796."); Karlin v. Foust, 975 F.Supp. 1177, 1215 (W.D.Wis.1997) ("The methods an expert
employs to reach his opinion must be at least as precise as the methods his profession would
require for out-of-court research. People Who Care, Il1 F.3d at 536; see also Sheehan v. Daily
Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.1997) (expert must be as careful in testimony to
court as she would be in regular professional work).").
For cases illustrating the exclusion of expert testimony not buttressed by an explanative
theory meeting the foregoing test, see Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 520-21 (8th Cir.
1999):
The metallurgist Dolence contacted was Sandy Lazarowicz. Dolence told
Lazarowicz his theory of the fire and asked him to take a look at the Weisgram
heater. Lazarowicz examined the thermostat contacts and the high limit control
contacts from the heater and studied the same components in the Ferguson heater.
He was qualified as an expert in the properties of metals. Admittedly, however, he
was not an expert in fire cause and origin, in baseboard heater operation, or in the
design or testing of contacts in such a unit. See Trial Tr. of May 27, 1997
(testimony of Sandy Lazarowicz), at 16-17, 64.
He testified that the thermostat contacts were defectively designed because
they were serrated. The rough surfaces caused arcing and material transfer between
the contacts. He theorized that "the continual usage and build up of defects on the
surface" of the contacts must have caused them to weld, and that they could not then
pull apart (at least not until the heat from the' fire in the home softened the weld).
Id. at 81. Thus, he said, there was a closed circuit, the heater did not shut off, and
that is why the unit overheated. He formulated his theory knowing practically
nothing about the Weisgram heater, or any other baseboard heater for that matter.
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For example, when he formed his opinions he was unaware of the heater's wattage
or the amperage it drew, and therefore could not say if the thermostat contacts could
have reached a high enough temperature to melt the metal and to form a weld before
the fire. See id. at 69-71, 73. He performed no tests to determine whether it was
even theoretically possible that the contacts could get sufficiently hot to weld during
operation of the heater. In fact, in his first deposition, Lazarowicz was unable to say
for certain that the contacts actually had welded, notwithstanding his examination of
them under an electron microscope. Only after closer examination of the contacts
from the Ferguson exemplar was he able to see the evidence of welding in the
Weisgram contacts. We think the District Court abused its discretion when it
permitted this testimony from Lazarowicz.
Further, as we have explained, the heater had a backup system that would
prevent it from dangerously overheating even if the heater ran amok because the
thermostat failed to shut it off: the high limit control. In order for the heater to be
defective in the way the plaintiffs theorize, the high limit control had to fail to shut
off the electrical current to the heater at the very same time that the thermostat was
failing. Lazarowicz testified that the high limit contacts did not open when the unit
was energized (receiving current), but opened only after the fire was well underway.
He theorized that this failure may have occurred because the high limit control's
temperature sensing mechanism was placed within the unit in a location where it
could not detect the actual temperature of the heater. He had metallurgic evidence
for the opinion that the contacts did not open while electricity was flowing through
the heater (and, in fact, other witnesses noted the same evidence). But he had no
metallurgic reason for his conclusion that the device was not properly sensing the
temperature, because, of course, that is not a metallurgic issue. Lazarowicz testified
that he had performed no tests on the Ferguson exemplar to see if its high limit
switch functioned properly, or to determine if in fact there was a defect (in design)
in that similar heater. He did not have the necessary experience-either from his
work as a metallurgist or from tests performed in connection with this case-to be.
qualified as an expert who could testify that the high limit control failed because it
was defectively designed or manufactured.
Lazarowicz's opinions amount to no more than "subjective belief or
unsupported speculation." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786. We conclude
that the nexus between his observations of the contacts and his conclusion that the
heater was defective is not scientifically sound. He admittedly had very limited
experience with electrical contacts in small appliances and no experience with how
contacts function in baseboard heaters. "[T]here is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 519, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997).
Therefore, his testimony was unreliable and it was an abuse of discretion to
allow it.
Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir.1998):
Aristo Vojdani holds a Ph.D. in immunology. Cabrera wanted Vojdani to tes-
tify that he had tested a sample of her blood in August 1993, and found the presence
of silicone antibodies. Those antibodies would support Cabrera's contention that
she was undergoing an autoimmune response to silicone. Cordis opposed the
admission of his testimony because Vojdani's test for silicone antibodies was not
scientifically reliable as required by Daubert. The district court agreed that the test
did not satisfy Daubert.
First, the court noted that only Vojdani used the test he had performed on
Cabrera's blood, and there is no generally accepted blood test for silicone antibo-
dies. Cabrera counters that two other labs perform a similar test. At the hearing,
however, the district judge sustained Cordis' objection to the introduction of test
results from another laboratory, and Vojdani testified only that several other labora-
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tories perform silicone antibody tests, although he did not know if they performed
the same test he uses. Vojdani also testified that his test had never been peer-
reviewed. Vojdani had no documentation of even his own development of the test,
as his records were destroyed in an earthquake. Further (although this is not dispos-
itive), the Federal Drug Administration does not recognize any silicone antibody test
at all.
The district court was within its discretion in excluding Vojdani's testimony.
Vojdani provided no explanation of" 'precisely how [he] went about reaching his
conclusions' "regarding the accuracy of his testing measure, and could not" 'point
to some objective source... to show that [he has] followed the scientific method, as
it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in [his] field.' " Lust,
89 F.3d at 597 (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317). Although Cabrera argues that
the test results should have been admitted because the test was conducted with no
connection to the litigation, that argument does not substitute for the lack of founda-
tion for the test itself. The district court properly considered the methodology
Vojdani used, rather than the test results, and did not abuse its discretion by finding
it lacking in reliability.
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999), speaks favorably of the
approach:
To say this is not to deny the importance of Daubert's gatekeeping require-
ment. The objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of
expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field. Nor do we deny that, as stated in Daubert, the particular questions
that it mentioned will often be appropriate for use in determining the reliability of
challenged expert testimony. Rather, we conclude that the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining
whether particular expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial court should
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable meas-
ures of the reliability of expert testimony. (emphasis added).
The foregoing approach continues to be applied after Kumho. See, e.g., Tanner v. West-
brook, 174 F.3d 542, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1999):
Our review of the admissibility issue is, of course, guided by Daubert, the
cases applying it, and Kumho Tire. In Daubert, the Supreme Court provided a list of
factors, such as testing, peer review, error rates, and acceptance of the opinion in the
relevant scientific community, that a court may choose to use in determining the
reliability of an expert's testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct.
2786; see also Kumho Tire, - U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1175 (emphasizing that the
list of factors was not exclusive and that the factors may not always apply to the
testimony at issue). The test of reliability is flexible and bends according to the
particular circumstances of the testimony at issue. See Kumho Tire, - U.S. at -,
119 S.Ct. at 1175; see also Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311 (5th
Cir.1999) (advising that courts should use the traditional Daubert factors as a start-
ing point for evaluating proffered expert testimony). Whatever the test employed,
the objective is to ensure the reliability and relevance of the expert testimony. See
id.
"The proponent [of the expert testimony] need not prove to the judge that the
expert's testimony is correct, but she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the testimony is reliable." Moore, 151 F.3d at 276. The theory of the Tanners'
case was that Jennifer Tanner's cerebral palsy was caused by birth asphyxia that the
defendants improperly treated in the hours immediately following her birth. The
Tanners' experts, Drs. St. Amant and Nestrud, supported this theory at trial by stat-
ing generally that birth asphyxia is a cause of cerebral palsy. The doctors made this
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statement based on their personal knowledge and training and supported it with
medical literature. The doctors also opined, based on their experience in the fields
of obstetrics and neonatology, that Jennifer suffered from birth asphyxia and that,
through proper treatment of this condition, Jennifer's cerebral palsy could have been
avoided.
BMH, on the other hand, insists that the cerebral palsy-causing incident
occurred some time before Jennifer Tanner was born. BMH asserts that the major
insult suffered by Jennifer prior to her birth caused a difficult labor and delivery,
during which, as a result of this difficulty, she suffered birth asphyxia. That is,
BMH agrees with the Tanners that Jennifer Tanner suffered from asphyxia at birth;
BMH does not agree, however, that birth asphyxia or the hospital's treatment of it
caused Jennifer Tanner's cerebral palsy.
BMH supported its theory by submitting with its motion for an FRE 104 hear-
ing an expert's affidavit and scientific literature pointing out that Jennifer's condi-
tion is not indicative of cerebral palsy caused by birth asphyxia. The medical
literature states that birth asphyxia is rarely a cause of cerebral palsy and that a large
proportion of cases of cerebral palsy remains unexplained. See Karin B. Nelson &
Jonas H. Ellenperg, Antecedents of Cerebral Palsy, NEW ENGLAND J. MED., July 10,
1986, at 85-86. The medical literature also indicates that when birth asphyxia is
severe enough to cause cerebral palsy, there is usually evidence of corresponding
major organ damage. See Richard L. Naeye et al., Origins of Cerebral Palsy, 143
AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 1160 (1989). The organ damage is caused by preferen-
tial perfusion, a phenomenon triggered by asphyxia in which there is a redistribution
of blood flow, with increased flow to the head and heart and decreased flow to non-
vital organs. See AVROY A. FANARort & RICHARD J. MARTIN, NEONATAL-PER-
INATAL MEDICINE (5th ed.). Jennifer Tanner did not suffer from major organ dam-
age in conjunction with her cerebral palsy. Furthermore, the literature maintains
that many of Jennifer's symptoms in the hours after her birth support the conclusion
that she suffered from congenital defects which, rather than asphyxia, probably trig-
gered her cerebral palsy. See Naeye et al., supra, at 1159. Moreover, one study
specifically stated that "[a] failure of medical personnel to react to evidence of...
asphyxia was followed by a greater-than-expected frequency of neonatal apnea and
seizures, but not CP." Id.
In response to BMH's FRE 104 motion materials, the Tanners provided copies
of their experts' deposition testimony and supporting medical literature. These
materials addressed BMH's contention that Jennifer's cerebral palsy was likely
caused by some congenital defect, rather than birth asphyxia. The affidavits of both
Dr. St. Amant and Dr. Nestrud state that there was no evidence of a congenital
defect and that, as a result, they eliminated that explanation for her resulting condi-
tion. The doctors also opined that the lack of damage to Jennifer's nonvital organs
was "consistent with [their] opinions that most of Jennifer's asphyxial damage
occurred following her birth, and not in utero .... The Tanners, however, provided
no medical literature supporting their experts' claims that Jennifer's symptoms-
including the absence of nonvital organ damage-were consistent with their theory
of causation. Further, in his deposition, Dr. Nestrud testified that he was not aware
of any genetic causes for Jennifer's cerebral palsy, but, in order to rule out genetic
causes, "a good physical examination by a qualified physician" was necessary; Dr.
Nestrud had neither conducted such an exam nor reviewed the results of such an
exam when he testified at his deposition.
The trial judge could have correctly concluded, based on the FRE 104 motion
materials, that Dr. Nestrud had sufficient expertise, based on his experience and
training, to testify about the standard of care to be given to a baby suffering from
asphyxia. His ability to testify reliably about the cause of Jennifer's cerebral palsy,
however, hinges on the validity of his opinion linking the post-birth asphyxia to
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These dual tests for assessing "scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge" returns the trial judge to the familiar and "doable" role
of determining whether an explanative theory is sufficiently trustworthy
to present to the trier of fact, by examining the theory in the context of
the particular field in which it belongs. The trial judge's task would be
to ascertain if the particular explanative theory is accepted or rejected by
experts in its particular field.6 If acceptance or rejection of the explana-
tive theory has not yet occurred, or the "widespread acceptance" test
does not comply with the way the explanative theory is derived in the
particular case, such as is generally true in product liability litigation and
sometimes with respect to medical clinical diagnosis and causation
issues, the court looks to particularized earmarks of trustworthiness,
which requires the judge to ascertain whether the given explanative the-
ory was derived in a manner consistent with the processes customarily
used by experts in the field.65 In either case, the trial court is looking to
experts in the particular field for assistance in assessing whether the
explanative theory is sufficiently trustworthy (i.e., sufficient assurances
of correctness are present to warrant jury acceptance).66 Daubert and
Jennifer Tanner's cerebral palsy-specifically the depth of his knowledge of a com-
plicated, specialized medical subject matter. He has no background in studying the
causes of cerebral palsy. He bases his opinion on causation in part upon articles
which state that asphyxia causes cerebral palsy. This fact is not disputed. What is
in dispute is whether it is more likely than not that a baby with Jennifer Tanner's
symptoms developed cerebral palsy as a result of the hospital's negligent treatment
of her birth asphyxia. "[T]he question before the trial court was specific, not gen-
eral. The trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient spe-
cialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in this case."
Kumho Tire, - U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1178 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Based on the materials before the trial judge, Dr. Nestrud did not have the
kind of specialized knowledge required to testify regarding causation, nor did he
rely upon medical literature directly addressing the causation issue in this case. This
deficiency rendered his expert testimony as to a critical issue in the case-causa-
tion-unreliable. Thus, admitting the testimony, based on the materials submitted
in support of its validity, was an abuse of discretion.
64. The expert's assertion alone is obviously insufficient. See Aldridge v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 34 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1023 (D.Md.1999) ("To be properly admissible under Rule 702,
expert testimony 'requires some objective, independent validation of the expert's methodology.
The expert's assurances that he has utilized generally accepted scientific methodology is
insufficient.' Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998); see also Cavallo v.
Star Enterprise, 892 F.Supp. 756, 760-61 (E.D.Va.1995), aff'd in part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th
Cir.1996).").
65. In determining whether the explanative theory has been sufficiently shown to possess
particularized earmarks of trustworthiness, the trial court may, but is not required to, consider,
amongst others, the five Daubert factors, see note 14 supra, as well as other factors set forth in the
Advisory Committee's Note at note 56 supra. As stated in Kumho, note 37 supra, "the law grants
a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect of its ultimate reliability determination." See note 63 supra for illustrative applications.
66. The following alternative amendment to Rule 702 is suggested:
Testimony providing scientific, technical or other specialized information, in
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Kumho, so interpreted, would remove the trial judge from becoming an
amateur scientist. Instead, the trial judge would look to the particular
field the explanative theory belongs to guide the court as to whether the
theory is sufficiently trustworthy to present to the jury for its considera-
tion. The ultimate decision whether the explanative theory is sufficiently
trustworthy, as actually applied, must, of course, remain with the trial
judge.67 In drawing upon the guidance of the field of expertise, the trial
judge possesses broad discretion. The trial court, as established by
Kumho, has the flexibility to consider whatever factors are relevant,
whether or not an original Daubert factor, when determining the trust-
worthiness of an explanative theory.
V. UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED AMENDED RULE 702
A proposed amendment to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is working its way to Congress pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act, for which the earliest possible effective date is December 1, 2000.
It states:
Rule 702. Testimony By Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
the form of an opinion, or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the information is
based upon adequate underlying facts, data or opinions, (2) the information is based
upon an explanative theory either (a) established to have gained widespread
acceptance in the particular field to which the explanative theory belongs or (b)
shown to possess particularized earmarks of trustworthiness, (3) the explanative
theory was applied in accordance with proper procedure, (4) the witness is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to provide such
information, and (5) the information will substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
67. As to the procedural requirements with respect to the gatekeeping determination, see
advisory committee's note FED. R. EvyD. 702 (proposed):
The amendment makes no attempt to set forth procedural requirements for
exercising the trial court's gatekeeping function over expert testimony. See Daniel
J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 38 Ga.L.Rev. 699, 766 (1998) ("Trial courts should
be allowed substantial discretion in dealing with Daubert questions; any attempt to
codify procedures will likely give rise to unnecessary changes in practice and create
difficult questions for appellate review."). Courts have shown considerable
ingenuity and flexibility in considering challenges to expert testimony under
Daubert, and it is contemplated that this will continue under the amended Rule.
See, e.g., Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular, 111 F.3d 184 (lst Cir. 1997)
(discussing the application of Daubert in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 736, 739 (3d Cir. 1994)
(discussing the use of in limine hearings); Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499,
502-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the trial court's technique of ordering experts to
submit serial affidavits explaining the reasoning and methods underlying their
conclusions).
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ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise-[681 ; if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, [69] (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.7 °
The Advisory Committee's Note maintains that proposed amended
Rule 702 is consistent with Kumho's interpretation of Daubert.
71
68. An expert may testify as to general principles without ever offering an opinion. See FED.
R. EvID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note. ("If the expert purports to apply principles
and methods to the facts of the case, it is important that this application be conducted reliably.
Yet it might also be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general
principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. For
example, experts might instruct the factfinder on the principles of thermodynamics, or
bloodclotting, or on how financial markets respond to corporate reports, without ever knowing
about or trying to tie their testimony into the facts of the case. The amendment does not alter the
venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general principles. For
this kind of generalized testimony, Rule 702 simply requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2)
the testimony address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert; (3) the
testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony 'fit' the facts of the case.").
69. The trial judge is not permitted to decide among sufficiently established facts, data, or
opinions. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note:
Subpart (1) of Rule 702 calls for a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis.
The amendment requires that expert testimony be based on sufficient underlying
"facts or data" The term "data" is intended to encompass the reliable opinions of
other experts. See the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703. The
language "facts or data" is broad enough to allow an expert to rely on hypothetical
facts that are supported by the evidence. Id.
When facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach different conclusions based
on competing versions of the facts. The emphasis in the amendment on "sufficient
facts or data" is not intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an expert's
testimony on the ground that the court believes one version of the facts and not the
other.
There has been some confusion over the relationship between Rules 702 and
703. The amendment makes clear that the sufficiency of the basis of an expert's
testimony is to be decided under Rule 702. Rule 702 sets forth the overarching
requirement of reliability, and an analysis of the sufficiency of the expert's basis
cannot be divorced from the ultimate reliability of the expert's opinion. In contrast,
the "reasonable reliance" requirement of Rule 703 is a relatively narrow inquiry.
When an expert relies on inadmissible information, Rule 703 requires the trial court
to determine whether that information is of a type reasonably relied on by other
experts in the field. If so, the expert can rely on the information in reaching an
opinion. However, the question whether the expert is relying on a sufficient basis of
information - whether admissible information or not - is governed by the
requirements of Rule 702.
70. FED. R. EvID. 702 (proposed draft).
71. The text of that note is as follows:
Proposed Advisory Committee's Note
Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying
Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In
Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as
gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho
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The structure of the proposed rule, as evidenced by its three-prong
proviso, implies that each of the three requirements is separate and dis-
tinct. It seems to require a court to declare that each prong is satisfied,
or that one or more have not been sufficiently established, when deter-
mining the admissibility of expert witness testimony.
In practice, the dividing line between the three requirements is
often at best incredibly unclear. More importantly, all three prongs are
part and parcel of a single determination. For example, in Kumho Tire
Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael,72 the Supreme Court explored all three
requirements in applying its "flexible" approach for determining
whether the plaintiffs expert witness's testimony was "reliable." The
requirements were discussed more or less together, with the court mov-
clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just
testimony based in science. See also Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1176 (citing the
Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 702, which had been released
for public comment before the date of the Kumho decision). The amendment
affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that
the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert
testimony. Consistently with Kumho, the Rule as amended provides that all types of
expert testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court in deciding
whether the evidence is reliable and helpful. Consequently, the admissibility of all
expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a). Under that Rule, the
proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent admissibility
requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence. See Boujaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing
the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific factors explicated by the
Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been
tested-that is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been
subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in
the scientific community. The Court in Kumho held that these factors might also be
applicable in assessing the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony, depending
upon "the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." 119 S.Ct. at
1175.
No attempt has been made to "codify" these specific factors. Daubert itself
emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor dispositive. Other cases have
recognized that not all of the specific Daubert factors can apply to every type of
expert testimony. In addition to Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1175, see Tyus v. Urban
Search Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that the factors mentioned
by the Court in Daubert do not neatly apply to expert testimony from a sociologist).
See also Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir.1997)
(holding that lack of peer review or publication was not dispositive where the
expert's opinion was supported by "widely accepted scientific knowledge"). The
standards set forth in the amendment are broad enough to require consideration of
any or all of the specific Daubert factors where appropriate.
72. 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999).
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ing between the three prongs of proposed Rule 702 freely without even
identifying them in any manner.
In Kumho, the expert witness for the plaintiff opined that the tire
blow out that caused the plaintiffs injury was due to a separation in the
tire.73 This separation resulted from a defect in the tire, and was not
caused by over-deflection (i.e., either overloading or under-inflation).7 4
The expert testified that in the absence of at least two of four signs of
abuse, observed through visual and tactile inspection,75 the separation
was caused by a defect.76
At the reliable explanative theory level, that is, proposed Rule
702(2) above, the Supreme Court concluded there was no indication in
the record that other experts in the industry used this two-factor test 77 or
that other experts "normally made the very fine distinctions, say, the
symmetry of comparatively greater shoulder tread wear that were neces-
sary"'78 for the expert to support his own theory. It also found no indica-
tion in the record that the expert, if still working for a tire manufacturer,
"would have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was
similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested
his conclusion. 79 In the same vein, the Court noted that the trial court:
could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of
visual and tactile inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with
some certainty the abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/
center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently precise to tell
'with any certainty' from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled
less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.8"
As to whether the facts, data, or opinions relied upon as the basis of
the experts opinion were sufficiently established, that is, proposed Rule
702(1) above, the record indicated that while the expert asserted that the
tire tread remaining had a depth of 3/32 inch, "the opposing expert's
(apparently undisputed) measurements indicate that the tread depth
taken at various positions around the tire actually ranged from .5/32 of
an inch to 4/32 of an inch, with the tire apparently showing greater wear
along both shoulders than along the center." 8'
73. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 1172 (1999).
74. See id. at 1173.
75. The four signs of abuse are: (1) proportionately great tread wear on the shoulder; (2) signs
of grooves caused by the beads; (3) discolored sidewalks; or, (4) marks on the rim flange. See id.
at 1172.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1178.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1179.
80. Id. at 1177.
81. Id. at 1178.
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Regarding proper application, that is, proposed Rule 702(3) above,
the expert testified, with respect to the sign of abuse known as bead
grooving, "that most tires have some bead groove pattern, that where
there is reason to suspect an abnormal bead groove he would ideally
'look at a lot of [similar] tires' to know the grooving's significance, and
that he had not looked at many tires similar to the one at issue."82
In short, the Supreme Court in Kumho did what should be done in
all cases - it looked at all three requirements as if there were one
requirement:
For one thing, and contrary to respondents' suggestion, the specific
issue before the court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire
expert's use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether
over-deflection had caused the tire's tread to separate from its steel-
belted carcass. Rather, it was the reasonableness of using such an
approach, along with Carlson's particular method of analyzing the
data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular
matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.
83
In fact, the best way to assess an expert witness's explanative theory is
to combine the three requirements of proposed Rule 702, and ask, "As
actually applied in the matter at hand to facts, data, or opinions suffi-
ciently established to exist, are there sufficient assurances present that
the expert witness' explanative theory produces a correct result to war-
rant jury acceptance?" 84
82. Id. at 1178
83. Id. at 1177 (emphasis added).
84. Formulating the gatekeeping determination in a single question eliminates the apparent
uncertainty displayed by the Supreme Court with respect to the relationship between the
explanative theory and the conclusion reached from its application. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court stated that the "focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology [i.e.,
explanative theory], not on the conclusions that they generate." 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at
2797. But in Joiner, the Supreme Court opined that "conclusions and methodology [i.e.,
explanative theory] are not entirely distinct from one another." - U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 519.
Finally, in Kumho the Supreme Court observes that the focus is not in fact upon the
"reasonableness" of the explanative theory itself but rather upon "the reasonableness of using such
an approach ... to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter which the expert testimony
was directly relevant." - U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1177.
Kumho's approach of asking a unified question-as actually applied in the matter at hand to
facts, data, or opinions sufficiently established to exist, are there sufficient assurances present that
the expert witness's explanative theory produces an accurate result to warrant jury acceptance?-
clarifies that the explanative theory of the expert and the conclusion of the expert are not distinct
at all but rather simply two elements of a single question. This is not, of course, equivalent to
saying that whether the explanative theory is "reliable" and the actual correctness of the expert's
conclusion as testified to in court are not separate issues. For example another expert may apply
the same or a different explanative theory to the same or a different basis and reach a different
conclusion. If the second expert's testimony also passes Kumho gatekeeping, the trier of fact
would be charged with deciding which conclusion, if either, to accept.
Focusing on the presence of sufficient assurances that the explanative theory produces an
accurate result to warrant jury acceptance avoids the dilemma that could be faced by the court if a
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The above approach, which was employed in Kumho, avoids
problems in analysis which may arise if each of the three requirements
were treated as separate. In Kumho itself, visual and tactile observation
was assumed to be a reliable method of determining why the tire tread
separated from its steel-belted carcass.85 However, if we assume that
visual and tactile inspection employing a four sign approach is shown to
possess sufficient assurances of correctness (i.e., "reliable") to warrant
jury acceptance, and that such explanative theory requires the presence
of all four signs for a conclusion of defect to be reached, then what
happens if the evidence indicates that only three of the four signs are
present to the required extent?
If the three requirements specified in proposed amended Rule 702
are treated separately, even though there is an explanative theory that is
the product of reliable principles and methods (702(2)), there is an inad-
equate basis of facts, data or opinions to support the theory (702(1))
because the fourth sign has not been established. Arguably, then, the
testimony should be excluded because it is not "based upon sufficient
determination was made that the explanative theory actually "works". What if two competing
explanative theories applied to the same facts, data or opinions resulted in opposite conclusions?
If the court, under Rule 104(a), was to determine that it is more probably true than not that one of
the two explanative theories produced an accurate result when properly applied, then the other
explanative theory, of course, could not do so also. In short, under such circumstances the court
would be required in theory to permit one explanative theory to be heard by the jury but not the
other. On the other hand, if the trial court's determination focused on sufficient assurances of a
correct result, both explanative theories could in theory be presented to the jury, a result clearly
favored by Daubert. Accord FED. R. EvID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note to proposed
Rule 702 ("When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's testimony is
reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The
amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or
methods in the same field of expertise. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146,
160 (3d Cir.1999) (expert testimony cannot be excluded simply because the expert uses on test
rather than another, when both tests are accepted in the field and both reach reliable results). As
the court stated in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir.1994),
proponents 'do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the
assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that their opinions are reliable .... The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower
than the merits standard of correctness.' See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.1995) (scientific experts might be permitted to testify if they could
show that the methods they used were also employed by 'a recognized minority of scientists in
their field.'); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir.1998) ('Daubert neither requires
nor empowers trial courts to deterimine which of several competing scientific theories has the best
provenance.').").
85. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1178 (1999) ("Respondents now
argue to us, as they did to the District Court, that a method of tire failure analysis that employs a
visual/tactile inspection is a reliable method, and they point both to its use by other experts and to
Carlson's long experience working for Michelin as sufficient indication that that is so. But no one
denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and
specialized experience. Nor does anyone deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be
identified by qualified experts through visual or tactile inspection of the tire.").
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facts, [] data [, or opinions] ."86 Alternatively, an expert's testimony
may not be the product of reliable principles and methods (702(2))
because an explanative theory employing only three signs has not been
established to possess sufficient assurances of correctness to warrant
acceptance. Lastly, if an explanative theory requiring the presence of
four signs is applied when only three signs are present, or if the determi-
nation of the presence of one or more of the four signs was not done in
applying that aspect of the explanative theory in accordance with proper
procedure, 7 then arguably the explanative theory is not being applied in
accordance with proper procedures (702(3)).
The foregoing arguments demonstrate that Kumho is correct in
viewing the determination of the presence of sufficient assurances of
correctness in the explanative theory as a single issue. This method of
determining admissibility of an expert witness's opinion using an
explanative theory in any area of scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge was further illustrated in Blue Dane Simmental v. American
Simmental Association.8 Blue Dane involved the effect of introducing
19 cattle (known as Risinger animals) that were only 97% pure breed
Simmental to a total cattle market of 138,169 pure simmental cattle.89
The plaintiffs economist's position was:
Dr. Baquet was to testify that the introduction of the nineteen
Risinger animals into the fullblood Simmental market in the United
States caused the market value of all American Simmentals to drop
substantially. To support this testimony, he noted that prior to the
introduction of the Risinger animals, both the Canadian and Ameri-
86. FED. R. EvlD. 702 (proposed draft).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note:
The Court in Daubert declared that the "focus, of course, must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate." 509 U.S. at
595. Yet as the Court later recognized, "conclusions and methodology are not
entirely distinct from one another." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997). Under the amendment, as under Daubert, when an expert purports to apply
principles and methods in accordance with professional standards, and yet reaches a
conclusion that other experts in the field would not reach, the trial court may fairly
suspect that the principles and methods have not been faithfully applied. See Lust v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.1996). The
amendment specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the
principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether those principles and
methods have been properly applied to the facts of the case. As the court noted in In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir.1994), "any step that
renders the analysis unreliable... renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This
is true whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely
misapplies that methodology."
88. 178 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999).
89. See Blue Dane Simmental v. American Simmental Association, 178 F.3d 1035, 1039 (8th
Cir. 1999).
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can Simmental markets were dropping. Following the introduction of
these animals, the United States market dropped another 53%, while
the Canadian market dropped only 26%. Dr. Baquet attributed this
27% difference in market price to the introduction of the Risinger
Simmentals. 90
Dr. Baquet admitted during his deposition
that various factors contribute to particular cattle breeds losing mar-
ket value. He stated that generally an economist would attempt to
identify and evaluate all of the independent variables significantly
affecting changes in the value of a breed. Dr. Baquet acknowledged
that he had neglected to consider any variables other than the intro-
duction of the Risinger fullbloods.91
The Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to exclude Dr.
Baquet's testimony primarily on the basis that Dr. Baquet used a method
of analysis - the before and after method - "without considering all
independent variables that could affect the conclusion."92 Therefore,
sufficient assurances of correctness to warrant jury acceptance (i.e., reli-
ability) had not been established with respect to the particular method of
analyzing data actually employed by the expert to draw the conclusion
that the 27% difference in United States Simmental cattle prices during
the relevant period was the result of the introduction of the Risinger
cattle.93
If viewed as three separate requirements, which requirement or
requirements are not satisfied? Is before-and-after analysis an explana-
tive theory that is the "product of reliable principles and methods" when
applied after considering all independent variables significantly affecting
changes in the value of a breed? "Probably yes," although the court
stated, "We find no evidence in the record that other economists use
before-and-after modeling to support conclusions of causes of market
fluctuation."94 But Dr. Baquet had not considered all such variables.
Thus, with respect to the explanative theory actually employed where
only the introduction of the 19 Risinger animals was considered as a
possible cause in market fluctuation, the answer as to sufficient assur-
ances of correctness is clearly, "No."
Which view is intended? It appears that the former question is
being asked. That is, is there "an" explanative theory employing before
and after analyses that possesses sufficient assurances of correctness?
The answer is, "probably yes."
90. Id. at 1040.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1041.
93. See id. at 1040.
94. Id. at 1041.
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But what about the requirement that the testimony be based upon
sufficient facts, data, or opinions? Clearly this requirement is not satis-
fied if the explanative theory requirement as stated above is inquiring
whether there is an explanative theory that can work. The explanative
theory that has sufficient assurances of correctness requires considera-
tion of all independent variables that significantly affect changes in the
market price.
Finally, the expert must have applied the explanative theory "relia-
bly," i.e., properly, to the facts, data, or opinions sufficiently established
to exist. What does this mean in the context of Blue Dane? If you fail
to consider relevant variables, can it be said that the explanative theory
has been properly applied? "No" if the explanative theory requires con-
sideration of all independent significant variables but "Yes" if the
explanative theory examines solely the introduction of the 19 Risinger
animals. In the latter case, the testimony fails for absence of sufficient
assurances that the explanative theory works, not because of basis or
application, since the theory only requires consideration of the one vari-
able constituting the basis. This single-fact basis had been sufficiently
established and was properly considered in Blue Dane.
Thus, once again as instructed by Kumho, as stated in Blue Dane,
[I]t was not the general acceptance of the methodology that was rele-
vant, "[riather, it was the reasonableness of using such an approach,
along with [the expert's] particular method of analyzing the data
thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular mat-
ter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant."95
As developed above, if each of the three requirements is treated as sepa-
rate "general acceptance of the methodology" becomes, in fact, a "rele-
vant" question. Asking such a question is not necessary, although
sometimes helpful, since the only question that must be answered is
whether there exist sufficient assurances of correctness of the explana-
tive theory to warrant jury acceptance as actually applied to facts, data,
or opinions in the case.
In summary, both Kumho and Blue Dane illustrate that the proper
application of the proposed amended Rule 702 is as a single question.
Treating each requirement independently would lead to an unnecessary
determination whether "an" explanative theory possessing sufficient
assurances of correctness exists generally in the matter at hand. Focus-
ing on such a determination requires two additional questions to be
asked: "Has a sufficient basis been established?," and "Was the explan-
ative theory applied properly to such basis?" Instead, the more helpful
way to state the entire issue, as done in Kumho and Blue Dane, is to
95. Id. at 1040 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1177 (1999)).
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simply ask, "Has the explanative theory as actually applied to facts, data
or opinions sufficiently established to exist been shown to possess suffi-
cient assurances of correctness to warrant jury acceptance?"
VI. CONCLUSION
With Kumho's interpretation of Daubert clarifying that the
gatekeeping obligation of explanative theory "reliability" screening is
applicable to all expert witness testimony regardless of whether scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, deciding what is meant
by "reliable" takes on great importance. Determining whether an
explanative theory actually works is neither appropriate nor wise. Obvi-
ously, the role of the trial judge as "gatekeeper" is to prevent the trier of
fact from relying upon expert testimony that does not warrant accept-
ance, not to decide which explanative theories produce "the" correct
result. Trial courts are poorly equipped by training, education, and
experience to make such a determination, not to mention uncomfortable
in deciding whether an explanative theory actually works. As evidenced
by reported decisions, judges believe that their proper role, one they
undertake frequently, is to determine if sufficient assurances of correct-
ness have been established to warrant jury acceptance of the results of
the actual application of the explanative theory in the matter at hand to
sufficiently established facts, data, or opinions. 96
While proposed amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is not entirely clear as to what is meant by "reliable," the "suffi-
cient assurance of correctness" interpretation is certainly consistent with
the text of the rule and relevant segments of the Advisory Committee's
Note; compatible with Kumho; and favored by judicial opinions speak-
ing to the issue. As we enter the new millennium, it should be recon-
firmed that trial judges are not amateur scientists, but rather they should
be expected to look to the particular area of expertise for guidance in the
form of the widespread acceptance test. Where such guidance is not
forthcoming, the trial judges should determine whether sufficient assur-
ances of correctness have been established by focusing on the existence,
or lack thereof, of particularized earmarks of trustworthiness. The focus
is on whether the explanative theory was derived and employed in a
manner consistent with processes customarily used by experts in the par-
ticular field. In making this decision, the flexible approach to factor
analysis of Kumho comes into play.
Confirming the traditional role of the trial judge as a gatekeeper
who seeks sufficient assurances of correctness rather than as a determi-
96. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 20.
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nator of correctness will put trial judges in the position of being asked to
do what they are familiar with, and very well equipped to do. At the
same time, it will enhance the "liberal thrust" to admissibility of expert
witness testimony that was favored by Daubert.
